Cultural System vs. Pan-cultural Dimensions: Philosophical Reflection on Approaches for Indigenous Psychology

KWANG-KUO HWANG

ABSTRACT

The three approaches for conducting psychological research across cultures proposed by Berry (1989), namely, the imported etic, emic and derived etic approach are critically examined for developing culture-inclusive theories in psychology, in order to deal with the enigma left by Wilhelm Wundt. Those three approaches have been restricted to a certain extent by the pan-cultural dimensional approach which may result in the Orientalism of psychology in understanding people of non-Western cultures.

This article is designated to provide the philosophical ground for an alternative cultural system approach to construct culture-inclusive theories in psychology. Following the principle of cultural psychology: “one mind, many mentalities” (Shweder et al., 1998), the alternative strategy contains two steps: First, based on Bhaskar’s (1975, 1978) critical realism, all universal mechanisms should seek to represent the operation of the human mind. Second, based on Archer’s (1995) analytical dualism, the mechanisms of the universal mind may be used as frameworks for analyzing any cultural tradition. The culture-inclusive theories thus obtained represent the synchronic morphostasis of a cultural system, which may be used as theoretical frameworks for conducting either qualitative or quantitative empirical research in studying the diachronic morphogenesis of socio-cultural interaction in a particular culture.

Keywords: culture-inclusive theories, morphostasis, morphogenesis, critical realism, analytical dualism

I. THE ENIGMA OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY

As a guest editor for this special issue, I would like to highlight the significance of this issue for the future development of psychology in light of its historical
background. When Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) established his first laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, he conducted experiments on “lower cognitive functions” using the method of controlled introspection on consciousness. He described his approach and findings of his research in *Principle of Physiological Psychology* (Wundt, 1874/1904). Recognizing the restriction of this approach to understand “higher forms of human intellect and creativity” as presented in culture, he used historical methods to study cultural issues in volumes of *Völkerpsychologie* (Wundt, 1916).

Two Types of Psychology

Soon after the launching of scientific psychology, Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934), a young Russian psychologist who had been profoundly influenced by Western thoughts, also distinguished “lower” from “higher” psychological processes in 1927 for the sake of differentiating men from animals in phylogenetic continuity. Based on the distinction between “explanation of nature” and “understanding of human actions” formulated by Dilthey and Münsterberg, Vygotsky also distinguished two types of psychology: Causal psychology is a natural science aimed to study cause-and-effect relationships of lower psychological processes, while intentional psychology is “spiritualistic” for understanding human intentions as well as actions (Vygotsky, 1927/1987).

A comprehensive model of the human mind should incorporate both intentional psychology and causal psychology so that the influence of culture could be fully examined. Unfortunately, this is not an issue of major importance for mainstream psychologists aiming to develop scientific psychology. Though cultural issues are not completely neglected by psychologists, in *Cultural Psychology: A Once and Future Discipline*, for instance, Cole (1996) included Shweder, Bruner, Eckensberger and his action theory, in addition to recognizing that the second type of psychology (spiritual/intentional) has diminished in importance.

In recent years interest has grown in Wundt’s “second psychology,” the one to which he assigned the task of understanding how culture enters into psychological processes . . . My basic thesis is that the scientific issues Wundt identified were not adequately dealt with by the scientific paradigm that subsequently dominated psychology and other behavioral-social sciences . . . cultural-inclusive psychology has been . . . an elusive goal. (1996, pp. 7–8)

Two Approaches to Tackle Cultural Issues

Taking researches on Chinese psychology as examples, this special issue tackles the problematic situation faced by indigenous psychologists from various perspectives. Michael H. Bond is the most prominent scholar, who organized psychologists of various fields to review researches on related topics, edited and published
four books in English successively, coined the term “Chinese psychology” and introduced it to the international community. His article indicates the rationale and popularity of the pan-cultural dimensional approach (Bond, 2014). In opposition to this, my articles illustrate the philosophical ground of cultural system approach as well as several theoretical models constructed by multiple philosophical paradigms (Hwang, 2014). In defense of the cultural system approach, Sundararajan (2014) provides evidence to support my argument that the Face and Favor model represents a universal mechanism of social interaction; Liu (2014) proposes the concept of hierarchical relationalism along this line of reasoning; Qi (2014) examines the rehabilitation of Confucian core values from the traumatic Cultural Revolution since the CCP adopted the reform and open policy. Cultural psychologist Eckensberger (2014) discusses the possibility of integrating the indigenous with the universal from the perspective of his action theory, while historical psychologist Gergen (2014) addresses the issue of developing cultural inclusive psychology from a broader constructionist standpoint.

In the following sections, I will first elaborate the problematic situation faced by non-Western indigenous psychologists, and then I will present a proposal to deal with it with a careful reflection on philosophical grounds.

Asymmetrical International Exchange

During and after World War II, American psychologists had demonstrated to the government and to the general public that their expertise could be of great use to solve various social and personal problems. The prosperous postwar America resulted in the fast growth in every area of psychology and enabled it to become a rapidly expanding industry (Pickren, 2005, 2007). After the end of WWII, the United States became the major exporter of psychology and psychological education, while the Cold War era facilitated the asymmetrical international exchange of psychological knowledge from the center (the U.S.) to the non-Western peripheries, and rarely the other way around (Danziger, 2006).

When the knowledge and research paradigms of mainstream Western psychology were exported to non-Western countries, many non-Western scholars and practitioners found them to be irrelevant, incompatible, or inappropriate to understanding the local population; Western psychological knowledge cannot be used to solve their daily problems. As a consequence, some psychologists sought to develop indigenous psychologies against the dominance of Western psychology (Allwood & Berry, 2006).

According to an international survey conducted by Allwood and Berry (2006), the indigenization movement of psychology has taken place in different regions all over the world since the 1980s. With a careful examination over the historical origins, current problems and future perspectives of the IP movement provided by the survey’s 15 contributors, historian Danziger (2006) voiced a crucial challenge to all indigenous psychologists:
Adherence to the ideal of “a universal psychology” seems almost as common as a rejection of the “individualism” of Western psychology. Yet, in the history of Western psychology, individualism and the search for universal laws have been closely linked: Psychological laws would be considered universal insofar as they applied to all individuals along a common set of dimensions. Is it possible to break this link between individualism and universalism, as the remarks of several contributors seem to require? (2006, p. 272)

II. INTEGRATING CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

Indeed, the real challenge encountered by IPists all over the world is how to untangle the link between Individualism and Universalism. For instance, research findings of Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010a) indicated that 96% of the samples of psychological research published in the world’s top journals from 2003 to 2007 were drawn from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies, which house just 12% of the world’s population. They reviewed behavioral science comparative databases and found that the WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species across diverse domains, including visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. They thus concluded that there is no obvious a priori ground for claiming that such a particular psychological phenomenon is universal based on the sampling of such a single subpopulation.

In order to put theories of human behavior in psychology on a firmer empirical footing, they suggested that granting agencies should prioritize cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural research (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010b). Researchers must strive to evaluate how findings of their research apply to other populations; reviewers and editors of academic journals should give researchers credit for comparing diverse and inconvenient subjects and push them to support any generalizations with evidence.

Imposed Etic Approach

Berry’s (1989) three approaches for studying cultural psychology advocate for an imposed etic approach to studying the psychology of non-WEIRD populations in the theoretical contexts of Western psychology. Though this is a very popular research practice in many fields of psychology, it is strongly opposed by indigenous psychologists who prefer the emic approach because methodologically, it can aid the understanding of themselves in their own terms and draw upon their own culturally-rooted concepts and intellectual traditions (Berry, 1997, p. xii). Their preference for emic approach to explore new cultural systems and to discover psychological phenomena not available in the Western culture has been inspired by interpretative anthropology, particularly the influential works of Clifford Geertz.
In the 1970s, a move was afoot to emphasize more the symbolic view, in which culture was to be found within and between individuals in their shared meanings and practices . . . This emergent view (in anthropology) of culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodies in symbols” (Geertz, 1973, p. 89) and as “a conceptual structure or system of ideas” (Geertz, 1984, p. 8) has given rise to a more cognitive emphasis in psychology on the intersubjective, interpretive conception of culture, now broadly adopted by those who identify with “cultural psychology” (Cole, 1996; Shweder, 1990). (Berry, 2000, p. 199).

Expedient Emic Approach

Here it should be emphasized that the culture system depicted by the anthropological method of “thick description” is not the same as culture-inclusive theories advocated by indigenous psychologists. Historically scientific psychology is a social practice which is essentially an empirical investigative practice based paradigmatically on the notion of experiment. Danziger (1990) argued that psychological objects should not be identified merely as “discursive objects,” but as “epistemic objects” which involve both discursive and nondiscursive practices in their making. In other words, anthropologists and cultural psychologists might be satisfied with discursive practices in their making of cultural systems, but indigenous psychologists should demand more than that. They need culture-inclusive theories in psychology to help them conduct empirical investigative practice by scientific methods.

Due to the lack of comprehensive culture-inclusive theories constructed at the cultural system level, most indigenous psychologists adopt an expedient strategy of emic approach to explore the relationships among a few idiosyncratic cultural variables by reducing them into measurable dimensions for the sake of publishing their works in either domestic or international psychological journals. The accumulation of publications on empirical research of this type actually becomes its disadvantage and is criticized by mainstream psychologists. For instance, Triandis (2000) said:

It is very difficult to convince mainstream psychologists that they should pay attention to the findings of this approach. They say: I am interested in universal psychological phenomena, not in anthropology. Furthermore, there are potentially too many findings that can be generated by this approach. It is difficult to convince mainstream psychologists to pay attention to that many findings. In addition, the richness of findings, raises the question: Which findings are “really” important? One needs some criterion that can rank-order the importance of the findings. For example, do the findings predict behavior? (p. 191).

Derived Etic Approach

In fact, most cross-cultural psychologists prefer the derived etic approach. They conceptualize particular cultural characteristics as psychological syndrome and
develop measurement scales by the method of behavioral sampling for the sake of conducting empirical research. While the approach of derived etic psychology may be more informed by many other cultures, Berry himself recognized that it can hardly get rid of the ethnocentric nature. “It would still remain anchored in one specific cultural understanding.” (Allwood & Berry, 2006, p. 265)

Research on Individualism and Collectivism is the most popular and well-known exemplar of this approach in the field of social psychology. An intensive review by Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier (2002) showed that psychologists had constructed at least 27 distinct scales for measuring individualism-collectivism tendencies and completed numerous empirical studies on related topics in the last two decades.

Orientalism in Psychology

Most researchers engaging in this topic generally considered collectivism as the opposite of individualism. They assumed that the social structure of Western societies shaped by Protestantism and the process of civic emancipation contributed to such psychological traits of individualism as individual freedom, right of choice, self-realization, and so on (Triandis, 1995). The countries or ethnic groups that inherited a Protestant tradition should demonstrate more individualistic characteristics than non-Western traditional cultures. Moreover, individualism is more prevalent in Western industrialized countries than in other countries, especially in contrast to the more traditional societies of developing countries.

Psychologists studying individualism-collectivism have taken European-American psychological characteristics as a frame of reference for constructing their images of other cultural groups. European-Americans are situated at one end of the dimension with their cultural and psychological characteristics as coordinates of reference for understanding other ethnic groups around the world. Other ethnic groups are situated at different locations along the dimension, suggesting that their cultural identities are so vague that their psychological characteristics can be understood only if they are described in contrast to Americans/Europeans.

This approach represents typical Western psychological research, which has been deliberately constructed on the presumption of individuality, reductionism, experiment-based empiricism, scientism, quantification/measurement, materialism, and objectivity so as to obtain homothetic laws (Marsella, 2009). Therefore, Fiske (2002) criticized previous individualism-collectivism researches, he indicated that individualism is the sum of cultural characteristics by which Americans define themselves, while collectivism is formalized to show characteristics of the antithetical other in accordance with the American ideological understanding that “[w]e are not that kind of person” (p. 84).
A Yet to be Developed Approach of Collectivism

This approach represents a kind of Orientalism in psychology (Said, 1979). In fact, Westerners have no genuine interest in non-Western cultures; they just utilize non-Westerners as the antithetical other for understanding themselves. Analysis by Oyserman et al. (2002) provided concrete evidence that early psychological understandings of individualism and collectivism represent two types of different behavioral categories. They indicated that there is considerable heterogeneity among conceptual definitions of collectivism and measurement scales. The cultural difference in this respect may reflect its multifaceted nature in the connections between an individual and others. Following an intensive review of previous literature, they pointed out that:

American and Western psychology are infused with an understanding of human nature on the basis of individualism, raising the question of our ability to separate our current way of understanding human nature based on individualism from a yet to be developed approach of collectivism (Oyserman et al., 2002, pp. 44–45).

With a careful review and re-analysis of data in previous literature, Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2005) also indicated that the conceptual definition of individualism is clear, that instruments for measuring it are significant, and that it is a valid and important dimension for measuring cultural differences. However, the definitions of collectivism are ambiguous and varied, and the validity of instruments for measuring it is undetermined. Therefore, they suggested that it is necessary for cross-cultural psychologists to re-evaluate the meaning of collectivism.

III. PAN-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS VS. CULTURAL SYSTEM

The limitation of the pan-cultural dimensional approach by either imposed etic, expedient emic or derived etic approach can clearly be seen by reviewing psychological research findings in a single culture for a long period of time. For instance, Michael Bond (2010) published the Oxford Handbook of Chinese Psychology three years ago. This is the third book addressing Chinese psychology edited by Bond (1996, 1986). It contains 41 chapters by 87 authors who had intensively reviewed previous works on a variety of topics related to Chinese psychology.

Nonetheless, with his careful review of this book, Lee (2011) indicated that he: “Was somewhat puzzled and bothered by the fact that the book does not have a clear structure . . . It is thus difficult for readers to learn quickly about what is included in the book and to identify the chapter on a specific topic unless they go through the whole table of contents carefully. There is a general lack of theory in the whole handbook . . . The topic-oriented chapters have done a great job in reviewing and reporting extensively empirical findings in the field regarding the
Chinese people However, very few chapters offer indigenous theories of Chinese psychology (e.g. the chapter of Hwang and Han). Most of them stay at the level of confirming/disconfirming Western findings, referring to well-know cultural dimensions such as collectivism and power distance to explain the variation found, despite the openly stated effort to push for indigenous research. Moreover, most of the studies cited in the book simply dichotomized their findings as Chinese vs. Western, failing to capture the much more refined complexity of the world.” (pp. 271–272).

Alternative Theories to Mainstream Psychology

I authored a chapter that offers indigenous theories of Chinese psychology for that book. As an old friend of Michael Bond, he has always invited me to contribute a chapter when editing books on Chinese psychology. And I did so either as an author or co-author of a chapter.

From the perspective of scientific revolution (Kuhn, 1969/1990), when Western paradigms of psychology are transplanted to non-Western countries and encountered anomalies which cannot be explained by any imported theories, the pre-existing theories are in a state of crisis awaiting scientific revolution. In order to initiate a scientific revolution against Western mainstream psychological theories, it is necessary to construct alternative theories to compete with pre-existing Western psychological theories.

Since devoting myself to the social science indigenization movement in the 1980s, I soon realized that the fundamental barrier for Chinese social scientists to make a genuine breakthrough in research is a lack of comprehensive understanding on the progress of Western philosophy of science, which is the essential ethos of Western civilization.

Philosophy of Science

All the knowledge sought and taught in Western colleges has been constructed on the grounds of Western philosophy. In order to help Chinese young scholars understand the progress of Western philosophy of science, I spent more than ten years writing the book Logics of Social Science (Hwang, 2001/2013), which addresses different perspectives on crucial issues of ontology, epistemology and methodology proposed by eighteen noted Western philosophers in the twentieth century. The first half of this book addressed the switch in the philosophy of natural science from positivism to post-positivism. The second half expounded the philosophy of social science, including structuralism, hermeneutic and critical science.

It is one of my eternal beliefs that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered in the work of theoretical construction, non-Western IPists have to under-
stand not only their own cultural tradition, but also the Western philosophy of science. Based on such a belief, since appointed as the principal investigator of the Project in Search of Excellence for Research on Chinese Indigenous Psychology at the beginning of 2000, I have constantly attempted to resolve difficulties of constructing culture-inclusive theories in psychology by using various paradigms in the Western philosophy of science.

Confucian Relationalism

When the project ended in 2008, I integrated findings from previous related research into a book entitled Confucian Relationalism: Philosophical Reflection, Theoretical Construction and Empirical Research (Hwang, 2009), its English version was published with a new title, Foundations of Chinese psychology: Confucian Social Relations (Hwang, 2012).

Based on the principle of “one-mind, many mentalities” (Shweder et al., 1998), I advocated in this book that the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology is to construct a series of theories that represent not only the universal mind of human beings but also the particular mentality of people in a given society. I then explained how I constructed the theoretical model of Face and Favor which was supposed to represent the universal mind for social interaction, and then I used it to analyze the inner structure of Confucianism and discussed its attributes in terms of Western ethics. In the remaining chapters of this book, I constructed a series of theories on the presumption of relationalism to integrate findings of previous empirical research on social exchange, the concept of face, achievement motivation, organizational behaviors, and conflict resolution in Confucian society.

Pan-Cultural Dimensions

Michael Bond is a pioneer psychologist who has opened up the field of Chinese psychology and has organized psychologists from different parts of the world. He published the first English book on Chinese psychology (Bond, 1986), followed by two volumes of Handbook of Chinese Psychology (Bond, 1996, 2010), which successfully brought the term Chinese Psychology to the attention of the international psychological community. Therefore, he was invited to give an opening address in which he reviewed his academic life in a conference on the theme of The Construction of Culture-inclusive Theories in Psychology held at National Taiwan University in 2012. He also gave a keynote speech in which he explicitly illustrated his approach for studying the psychology of Chinese people.

Bond (2014) defended the pan-culture dimensional approach and argued that “we must develop measures of psychological constructs that are metrically equivalent across a host of cultural groups” in building models of interpersonal behavior.
He also gave a list of well-known psychological constructs, including dimensions or domains of values (e.g., Bond, 1988; Schwartz, 1992, respectively), types of self-construal (e.g., Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, & Heyman, 1996), social axioms or beliefs about the world (Leung & Bond, 2004), such motives as distinctiveness (Becker et al., 2012), and dimensions of stereotyping used by individual perceivers (Cuddy et al., 2009).

A Veritable Labor of Sisyphus

This is the typical derived etic approach of reductionism which has been frequently used by mainstream psychologists. Bond (2014) indicated that some of these adduced constructs have a provenance outside the mainstream and are non-WEIRD productions; they are indigenous in origin, but applicable pan-culturally. Such macroscopic approach of cross-cultural psychology tries to allocate various cultural groups in the world along one or several universal dimensions which constitute the scientific microworlds or psychological space constructed by psychologists.

All those pan-cultural dimensions could be said to be a kind of “culture-inclusive theories” in psychology. But, this approach doesn’t treat any concrete culture as a cultural system. Bond and van de Vijver (2011) argued that such pan-cultural dimensional approach may lead to the development of “universal” models which will allow psychologists to make prediction in conducting cross-cultural research:

If we have completely unpackaged the cultural difference by using a construct to predict the outcome, then we have effectively “made culture disappear”. In this vein, Lam et al. (2005) make cultural differences in affective forecasting disappear by unpackaging them with a culturally equivalent measure of focal thinking. As the authors concluded form their analysis, “defocused Euro-Canadians and East Asians made equally moderate affective forecasts”. (Bond & van de Vijver, 2011, pp. 85–86)

One might be astonished to learn that the successful development of a culture-inclusive model by the pan-cultural dimensional approach may result in the eventual elimination of culture! Though it is claimed that unpackaging the cultural difference with a culturally equivalent measure of focal thinking might enable the researcher to predict or forecast the outcome of empirical research in various cultures, defender of this approach also admitted that model-building by this approach without anchorage of any culture might become an endless process:

Even if we completely unpackaged the cultural difference, there is no end to model elaboration, because there is always more outcome variance to predict—gender, education level, and other categorical factors may also relate to the outcome. (Bond & van de Vijver, 2011, p. 86)
Thus, model-building by the pan-cultural dimensional approach becomes “an activity capable of almost endless expansion” which was teased as “a veritable labor of Sisyphus” (Jahoda, 2012, p. 293)!

A Confrontation

The 2012 Taipei conference became a confrontation of these two approaches. In her paper, “Indigenous psychology: Grounding science in culture, why and how?” Sundararajan (2014) strongly opposed such dimensional approach for studying culture. She argued that such dichotomous dimensions as individualism versus collectivism, or independent versus interdependent self-construal, may perpetuate the long shadows of Orientalism in psychology. “The difference detected by the one dimensional measure may be a difference that makes no difference psychologically to the local culture” (p. 236). Therefore, she cited Fiske (2002, p. 87): “We [Western psychology] must transcend our ethnocentric framework and not just study how other cultures differ from the United States but explore what they are intrinsically” and advocated for using the complex models of culture or system approach to replace the dimensional one.

A more Culturally Sensitive Future

Bond (2014) also acknowledged the importance of initiatives outside the mainstream WEIRD nations in extending the disciplinary compass of Western psychology. In the conclusion chapter of his 2010 Handbook, “Moving the scientific study of Chinese psychology into our twenty-first century: Some ways forward,” he quoted a paragraph from Arnett (2008):

The role of indigenous theorizing, then, is to enlarge our repertoire of constructs and theories in describing and explaining the human condition using scientific best practice. Their ultimate function is to demonstrate how, “Within the four seas, all men are brothers”. Non-mainstream cultural groups like the Chinese can enlarge our conceptual ambit, and ground psychology in the whole of human reality, not just their Western, usually American, versions (p. 713).

The conclusion chapter of Handbook of Chinese Organizational Behavior, which he co-edited with Huang (Huang & Bond, 2012), was even entitled “There is nothing more American than research on Chinese organizational behavior” for the sake of advising his Chinese colleagues “to be more culturally sensitive.” And the Chinese version of a famous Confucian saying, “learning without thinking leads to confusion; thinking without learning ends in peril” was engraved on the book’s cover.
A True Cultural Turn of Psychology

However, given the pre-condition of adhering to the methodology of imposed etic, emic, or derived etic approach, Bond (2014) understood that it is unlikely for indigenous psychologists to overcome the restriction of the pan-cultural dimensional approach:

“Indigenous constructs may feel natural and resonate better with those socialized into their originating community, but there is no guarantee that they will work better for social science when exported into the international arena. Thus litmus test remains to be passed.”

Eckensberger (2014) deliberately examined the three approaches of Berry’s (1989) schematization and drew to similar conclusion in his article. Therefore, he called for a “true cultural turn” of psychology and suggested indigenous psychologists to integrate culture and psychology by constructing a different “model of man” from mainstream psychology.

Eckensberger keenly indicated that the focus of indigenous psychology on specific cultural groups leads indigenous psychologists into the trap/difficulty of coping with the tension between the local culture (and its change) and global processes characterized by the often quoted phrase coined by Sheweder: “one mind, may mentalities.” “Hence it calls a general theory of culture which at the same time is applicable to the single case.”

IV. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A UNIVERSAL MODEL: CRITICAL REALISM

In view of Eckensberger’s (1979, 2012) action theory, I strongly agree with his suggestion that indigenous psychologists need a new “model of man” which may make a “true cultural turn” to achieve the aim of integrating culture and psychology. But, I do believe that this goal can be achieved by sophisticated reflection on Western philosophy of nature and social sciences, rather than any methodology of Berry’s (1989) schematization.

In accordance with my project, I proposed that the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology is to construct culture-inclusive theories that could represent both the universal mind of human beings as well as mentalities of people in a particular culture. My project contains two steps: First, I constructed the Mandala model of self (Hwang, 2011b) and the theoretical Face and Favor model (Hwang, 1987, 2009) to represent the universal structure of self and social relationship, respectively. Second, as suggested by the concept of “Person” in the Mandala model, which represents the cultural ideal of a given heritage (e.g., see Gergen, 2014), indigenous psychologists are obligated to study it for the sake of constructing culture-inclusive theories in psychology. I utilized my models as frameworks to analyze Confucianism. Thus we may understand the core values of Confucianism and the wisdoms embedded in the inspired actions.
In the remaining sections of this article, I will elaborate the philosophical grounds for attaining the aforementioned goals. Then, in my second article of this special issue, I will explain how I constructed the culture-inclusive theories of self and relationship by multiple philosophical paradigms.

Critical Realism

The Critical Realism proposed by Bhaskar (1975, 1978) is a philosophy attempting to integrate natural and social science. Roy Bhaskar was brought up in London by his Indian father and British mother. He decided to study philosophy, politics and economy when he attended Balliol College, Oxford University. When preparing his Ph.D. dissertation, he found that the economic development of developing countries can hardly be explained by Western theories of economy, so he transferred to the field of philosophy with a special interest in integrating natural and social science.

His philosophy was first called Transcendental Realism in his earlier work, A Realist Theory of Science (Bhaskar, 1975), which changed to Critical Naturalism in his Possibility of Naturalism (Bhaskar, 1978). Because he insisted on a position of anti-Positivism, rejected the challenges from post-modernism, and advocated for a rational science as well as the liberation function of philosophy, he was therefore suggested to call his philosophy Critical Realism.

Bhaskar (1975) differentiated the objects of scientific knowledge into two aspects, namely, the intransitive ontological aspect of unchanging real objects and the transitive epistemological aspect of changing cognitive objects. The transcendental noumena of real objects are intransitive and existing independent of any human description, while the cognitive objects of knowledge are artificial products of human beings, including assumptions, laws, models, theories, methodologies and techniques of research. All these are fallibilist products of human knowledge, therefore, the philosophy of Critical Realism advocates for an epistemological relativism.

Three Philosophies of Science

In chapter 20 of my book, Logics of Social Sciences (Hwang, 2001/2013), I presented Bhaskar’s philosophy of Critical Realism which classified Western philosophies of science into three broad categories. Classical empiricism was originally proposed by David Hume (1711–1776). It regards atomic facts as the ultimate objects of knowledge; their combinations constitute all the events which are objective to us in recognizing the external world. The logical structure of an elementary proposition stating relationships among names of objects is supposed to be isomorphic with that of the atomic fact in the objective world. Radical empiricists conceptu-
alize scientific knowledge as an individual’s behavioral responses to the stimuli of some events. Though logical positivists do not accept such approach of behaviorism as the only method for producing valid scientific knowledge, they still insist that the valid content of science must be reduced to such empirical facts and their combinations.

The second category consists of transcendental idealism proposed by Kant and the various versions derived from it. According to this school, the goal of scientific activities is the construction of theoretical models to depict the natural order. Hence theoretical models are constructed by scientists, though they might be independent from any particular individual, they cannot be independent from the scientific community. According to this school, scientific research aims to find the underlying structure from its manifested phenomena, the constant association among events is the necessary but not sufficient condition for deriving natural law. Knowledge about the natural world becomes a construction of human minds. The modern version of this school argues that scientific knowledge is constructed by the whole community of science.

The third school of transcendental realism argues that scientific activities aim to find the structure of mechanism for producing the phenomena. The objects of scientific research are neither the phenomena (empiricism) nor the constructs imposed on the phenomena (idealism), but the real structures which exist and operate independently from our knowledge. According to this perspective, the world exists independently from our knowledge about it. Both the world and our knowledge about it have their own structures which can be differentiated and are changing constantly. Science is not an epiphenomenon of nature, and nature is not a product manufactured by human beings.

Transcendental Theory

Bhaskar’s (1975) epistemology was named transcendental realism. The term transcendental was used to denote the fact that his philosophy is supported by the so-called transcendental argument, which means the inference from an observed phenomenon to a lasting structure, or the inference from a particular real event to a more basic or a more fundamental mechanism that makes the event possible. In terms of Bhaskar’s (1975, pp. 30–36) philosophy, transcendental argument is a kind of retroductive argument which requires a scientist to retroduce the “structure on the condition for originating a phenomenon” from a “description of that phenomenon.”

Bhaskar (1975, pp. 144–146) proposed a figure to illustrate the three steps of scientific discovery: The tradition of classical empiricism (including positivism) in the first step, the neo-Kantian school the second step, but meanings implied in the third step were not expounded on (see Figure 1).

Empiricism tries to find regularity from invariance of events on their sequences, but transcendental realism dialectically argues that it is the operational conse-
quence of the same mechanism. Both transcendental idealism and transcendental realism emphasize model building, but the latter has to imagine how generative mechanisms produce the phenomena for scientific research. The mechanisms can be imaginary for transcendental idealism, but they need to be real for transcendental realism. Scientists are obligated to verify this by various research methods.

The ontologies of these two schools can be distinguished by imaginary real, while their epistemologies are differentiated by imagined/known to be real. For transcendental realism, the theoretical models imagined by scientists at time point $t_1$ must be verified to be real at time point $t_2$ by experiment or other methods of empirical examination.

Universal Mechanisms

In Chapter 4 of my book, *Foundations of Chinese Psychology: Confucian Social Relations* (Hwang, 2012), I explained how I constructed the theoretical model of *Face and Favor* which is supposed to represent the universal mechanism for social interaction. In Chapter 1 of another book, *A Proposal for Scientific Revolution in Psychology* (Hwang, 2011a), I also proposed the *Mandala Model of Self* (Hwang, 2011b). Conceiving in the philosophy of Critical Realism (Bhaskar, 1975), both the *Mandala Model* and *Face and Favor Model* are supposed to be universal mechanisms of transcendental realism which might be manifested or cognitively activated in any given event of self-reflection or social interaction.

As I argued previously, the construction for culture-inclusive theories has to follow a basic principle of cultural psychology: “one mind, many mentalities”
The theory thus constructed must represent not only the universal mind of human beings determined by biological factors, but also mentalities of people shaped in a particular culture. Therefore, the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology is destined to integrate the philosophy of natural and social sciences which had been addressed by the philosophy of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975, 1978).

V. THE CONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE-INCLUSIVE THEORIES: ANALYTICAL DUALISM

The construction of the Mandala Model and Face and Favor Model are just the first step to attain the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology. It represents a new “model of man” which was deliberately re-troduced or sought out in replying to Eckensberger’s (2014) calling for indigenous psychologists. Both of them can be used to analyze any culture (Gergen, 2014), but none of them is culture-inclusive yet.

Myth of Cultural Integration

In order to attain the epistemological goal of indigenous psychology, we have to take the second step by taking advantage of the cultural and structural realism proposed by Archer (1995, 1996), as well as her analytical dualism, which should not be confused with philosophical dualism. She claimed that social structure, culture and agency are not separate entities, but it is useful to treat them as analytically separable. The analytical distinctions enable us to consider the substantive differences between them, to examine their interplay, and to sustain the respective analytical distinction between material interests and cultural ideas in social life (Archer, 1996).

Archer (2005) indicated that in comparison to social structure where units of analysis are easily identified (e.g. roles, organizations, institutions), the concept of culture and its properties tends to be grasped rather than analyzed. This lack of development in the concept of culture can be attributed to “the myth of cultural integration” which might trace back to early anthropology (Archer, 1995, p. 333). But it has profound influence on studies of contemporary psychology. If the definitions of culture proposed by cross-cultural psychologists are divided into three categories according to where they locate culture (Jahoda, 2012): (1) internal, (2) external, and (3) internal and external, the myth of cultural integration is most popular among psychologists who conceptualized culture as something located within the person. For instance, Hofstede (1984, p. 21) treated culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another;” Triandis (1996) proposed the concept of “cultural syndromes” and defined it as:
a pattern of shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, self definitions, norms, role definitions, and values that is organized around a theme that can be identified among those who speak a particular language, during a specific historical period, and in a definable geographic region. (Triandis, 1996, p. 408)

Analytical Dualism

Conceptualization of culture as “internal” provides a theoretical ground for psychologists to develop scales or questionnaires to “measure” or “investigate” culture. But, the myth perpetuates a view that culture is shared by the community (the social-cultural level, S-C), which results in the eliding of cultural meanings (the cultural system level, CS) in social theorizing (Archer, 2005). When culture and agency are conflated, no analytical distinction is made between the “parts of culture” and the “people;” this fallacy of conflations hinders the analysis of their interplay and prevents the interplay from being the foundation of cultural dynamics (Archer, 1996). Moreover, there is no source of internal cultural dynamics available to explain social change. Accordingly, sources of change are said to be externally located (Archer, 2005). Therefore, Archer proposed that an analytic distinction should be maintained between CS and S-C.

Archer’s proposal of analytical dualism must be mostly welcomed by cultural psychologists who conceptualize culture as external:

[i.e.] think of culture as a dynamically changing environment that is transformed by the artefacts created by prior generations . . . an artifact is an aspect of the material world that has been modified over the history of its incorporation into goal-directed human thought and action . . . an artifact is simultaneously ideal (conceptual) and material. It is material in that it is embodied in physical form, whether in the morphology of a spoken, written or signed world, a ritual, or an artistic creation, or as a solid object like a pencil. It is ideal in that this material form has been shaped by historical participation in (successful, adaptive) human activities . . . culture can be seen as the medium of human development which [prepares humans] for interaction with the world. (Cole & Parker, 2011, p. 135)

Or cross-cultural psychologists who conceptualize culture as internal and external:

. . . culture as networks of knowledge consisting of learned routines of thinking, feeling, and interacting with other people, as well as a corpus of substantive assertions and ideas about aspects of the world . . . it is . . . shared . . ., among a collection of interconnected individuals who are often demarcated by race, ethnicity, or nationality; (b) externalized by rich symbols, artefacts, social constructions, and social institutions (e.g., cultural icons, advertisements and news media); (c) used to form the common ground for communication among members; (d) transmitted from one generation to the next . . .; (e) undergoing continuous modifications . . . (Hong, 2009, p. 4)
Morphostasis of Cultural System

In contrast to listing representative examples of cultural artifacts without further investigation, Archer (1995) proposed the concept of cultural system and highlighted its distinction from socio-cultural interaction in her analytic dualism. As a result of being real human products, a cultural system which comprises all proposed ideas knowable at any one time may be true or false (Archer & Elder-Vass, 2012, p. 95). It is constituted by the corpus of existing intelligibilia, i.e. by all things capable of being grasped, deciphered, understood or known by someone. “By definition the cultural intelligibilia form a system, for all items must be expressed in a common language (or be translated in principle) since it is a precondition of their being intelligible.”

Archer and Elder-Vass (2012) proposed that a viable theoretical approach to both culture and structure ought to include diachronic as well as synchronic analysis. The former would examine how certain ideas came to prevail at a certain time, who advocated them, why and what challenges these ideas have encountered both in the past and at present. The latter would aim to understand what sustains morphostasis or cultural reproduction rather than morphogenesis or transformation over time (cf. Archer, 1996, p. 290).

Once the new “model of man” has been constructed, it can be used as a framework to study the morphostasis of any cultural system so as to develop culture-inclusive theories (Gergen, 2014).

One-Sidedness of Social Science

As to which aspect of culture is to be analyzed is determined by the researcher’s interest and value judgment. It is worthwhile to mention Weber’s (1949) famous saying in his classical work, The Methodology of the Social Sciences:

All analyses of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investing, and that it is only “important” in the sense of being “worthy of being known.”

Weber (1949, p. 71) argued that there are numerous cultural factors influencing a social phenomenon. The attempt of making an exhaustive description of all the individual components of a social phenomenon without any presumption may say nothing of explaining it causally. It is impractical as well as meaningless to make exhaustive cause and effect analysis in scientific research. We may endow cultural meaning to the scientifically “essential” aspect of reality in the infinitely manifold stream of events we believe are worthy of our reorganization. This is the so-called “one-sidedness” of social science.

Viewing from the perspective of analytical dualism (Archer, 1995), reinterpreting texts of pre-Qin Confucian classics may enable us to understand the cultural system or the *morphostasis* of Confucianism. Its derivatives as a consequence of socio-cultural interaction at different historical stages of China or in other East Asian regions constitute its *morphogenesis*.

In my second article of this special issue, I explain how I have constructed a series of culture-inclusive theories on Confucianism by my unique approach of multiple philosophical paradigms and used them to conduct empirical research in social psychology.

The “What” Question and “How”

Though I have devoted myself to prepare this book for more than twenty years, the significance of this approach has attracted more and more attention recently in light of the rise of China. Social scientists are aware of a rapid growth of necessity for understanding Confucian morphostasis when discussing various social problems in China. For instance, in an international conference on *Confucianism, Democracy and Constitutionalism: Global and East Asian Perspectives* held in Taipei, Taiwan, the well-respected Sinologist Roger T. Ames (2013) presented an article entitled *Confucian Role Ethics and Deweyan Democracy: A Challenge to the Ideology of Individualism* in which he indicated that:

Framing our question as “What is Confucianism?” in analytical terms tends to essentialize Confucianism as a specific ideology—a technical philosophy—that can be stipulated with varying degrees of detail and accuracy. What is a question that is perhaps more successfully directed at attempts at systematic philosophy where through analysis one can seed to abstract the formal, cognitive structure in the language of principles, theories, and concepts. However, the what question is at best a first step in evaluating the content and worth of a holistic and thus fundamentally aesthetic tradition that takes as its basic premise the uniqueness of each and every situation, and in which the goal of ritualized living is to redirect attention back to the level of concrete feeling. Beyond the “what” question, we need to ask more importantly after the always transforming and reforming content of a still persistent tradition: How has “Confucianism” functioned historically generation after generation within the specific conditions of an evolving Chinese culture to try to make the most of its circumstances? (Ames, 2013, pp. 20–21)
Dynamic Culture Change

It seems to me that such a question as “What is Confucianism?” should be answered by constructing culture-inclusive theories on various aspects of Confucian morphostasis. If and only if we are able to construct culture-inclusive theories to illustrate the morphostasis of Confucianism at the cultural system level, we are able to answer such questions as “How has Confucianism functioned historically generation after generation?” by studying its morphogenesis at a particular point in time and space. For instance, Liu (2014) reviewed a series of empirical research done by Chinese IPists and discussed the implications of the East Asian form of hierarchical relationalism in the age of globalization. Elliott, Katagiri, and Sawai (2012) studied the impact of new individualism on the traditional structure of hierarchical relation in Japanese society.

The Rehabilitation of Confucianism

Moreover, culture-inclusive theories may also be used to explain cultural changes in Chinese society. Archer and Elder-Vass (2012) indicated that the interplay between “ideas” of a cultural system and “group” is dynamic and accounts for cultural elaboration. A cultural system is distinct from socio-cultural interaction. At the socio-cultural level, certain parts of the social order may give prominence to a certain idea at a given point in time. The sharing of ideas is contingent. It is dependent on individuals who may uphold or promote certain ideas, the interest they generate and foster in support of those ideas, or the oppositions they encounter when promoting them.

Though Confucianism had been bitterly attacked by the hurricane of radical anti-traditionalism (Lin, 1979) during the period of the May-fourth Movement and Cultural Revolution, the concept of culture cannot be restricted to those ideas that are being sanctioned by certain sections of the social order at a certain time, because these represent only a portion of all ideas available for endorsement. Divergence may occur at the S-C level when other individuals or groups draw on ideas given less prominence to challenge the status quo (Archer & Elder-Vass, 2012).

Taking the core value of filial piety as an indicator, sociologist Qi (2014) discusses the rehabilitation of Confucianism in contemporary China in light of its rising. Insofar as my works may provide a more comprehensive understanding of the morphostasis of Confucianism, readers may have a better horizon to evaluate the pace of Confucian rehabilitation in China in the future.

Kwang-Kuo Hwang
Dept. of Psychology
National Taiwan University
REFERENCES


© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd


