台大心理系

Every episodic memory entails a sense of self. There is a special way by which the subject, who is remembering, comes in contact with one’s self, which is embedded in the episodic simulation. We can directly and robustly identify ourselves in memory with an accompanying sense of identity. This paper aims to explore what constitutes such identification in memory. The issue may seem prima facie trivial. It is natural for us to be able to identify ourselves in memory, since the experience of our recollection structurally resembles our perception of the original event. However, given the phenomenon of observer-perspective memory, in which our visual perspective is decoupled from our embodied self, it becomes unclear whether we identify with the observing self or the embodied one. I will examine the dimensions of the phenomenal self in observer-perspective episodic simulation, particularly in memory of skilled movement and social situation, to elucidate the relationship between field and observer perspectives and to argue that these perspectives can mutually contribute to our sense of self.